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Philosophy

Constitutionalizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the New Millennium
Chairperson: Bridget Clarke
With the emergence of recent democracies, scholars engaged in a polemic debate
about whether economic, social, and cultural rights should be included in national
constitutions. Because economic, social, and cultural rights appeared to require
significant political decision-making directly related to resources and economic priorities,
critics contended that they were non-justiciable; treating economic, social, and cultural
rights as justiciable would infringe on the balance of power among government branches.
This thesis argues that constitutional entrenchment of such rights is appropriate to their
realization in the twenty-first century because other methods of recognition may not
sufficiently address implementation problems. Furthermore, it argues such rights are
justiciable, using recent South African jurisprudence to illustrate a pragmatic judicial
approach that is sensitive to the balance of power criticism. Hence, constitutionalization
of economic, social, and cultural rights is practically achievable in the twenty-first
century; although judicially cognizable constitutionalization may take forms different
from the South African experience.
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Human beings suffer,
they torture one another,
they get hurt and get hard.
No poem or play or song
can fully right a wrong
inflicted and endured.
The innocent in gaols
beat on their bars together.
A hunger-striker's father
stands in the graveyard dumb.
The police widow in veils
faints at the funeral home
History says, Don't hope
on this side of the grave.
But then, once in a lifetime
the longed for tidal wave
of justice can rise up,
and hope and history rhyme.
So hope for a great sea-change
on the far side of revenge.
Believe that a further shore
is reachable from here.
Believe in miracles
and cures and healing wells . . . .
– Seamus Heaney, The Cure at Troy (excerpt)
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I.

Introduction

With the adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United
Nations formally recognized the importance of a broad spectrum of human rights. Not
only did the document include ―traditional‖ civil and political rights, it also contained
economic, social, and cultural rights.1 These newly recognized rights2 had their roots in
the Socialist thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries3 and the social
reform policies of the New Deal.4 Yet since the Universal Declaration‘s unanimous
adoption over sixty years ago, economic, social, and cultural rights5 have not enjoyed the

1

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 Dec. 1948) U.N. Doc. A/810.
Economic, social, and cultural human rights (as recognized in the Universal Declaration) include the right
to social security (in accordance with the organization and resources of the nation-state), the right to
work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to education, and
the right to participate in the cultural life of the community, among others. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, Articles 22–26.
3
University of Minnesota Human Rights Resource Center, "Circle of Rights: Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights Activism: An Historical Perspective on ESC Rights," 8 Nov. 2010
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/IHRIP/circle/modules/module2.htm>.
4
See Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Four Freedoms," Franklin D. Roosevelt's Address to Congress, 6 Jan. 1941
<http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/workbook/ralprs36b.htm>.
5
These rights have also been discussed using several terminologies. International legal treaties and
organizations divide human rights between civil and political rights and economic, social, and cultural
rights. In addition, Karel Vasak described rights in historical terms, introducing three “generations” of
human rights. According to Vasak, the first generation of rights includes “negative” rights “in the sense
that their respect requires that the state do nothing to interfere with individual liberties, and they
correspond roughly to the civil and political rights.” Karel Vasak, “A 30-year Struggle: The Sustained
Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Unesco Courier 30.10 (1977):
29. The second generation of rights required “positive action by the state to be implemented, as is the
case with most social, economic and cultural rights.” Jackson v. Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. Ill.
1983). The third generation of rights, which Vasak called “rights of solidarity,” include the right to a
healthy environment and the right to peace. Jackson, 1203. These rights are sometimes discussed as
liberty rights (civil and political rights) and claim rights (economic, social, and cultural rights). They are
also divided by their “negative” or “positive” characteristics. See also Alan Gerwirth, The Community of
Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 33-38. In any event, I shall refer to them by the legal
instrument title (economic, social, and cultural rights) for the duration of the paper; although cited
authors may refer to them using different terminology.
2

1

success or legitimacy of civil and political rights. They have suffered in terms of global
attention, advocacy, and practical implementation.
Although nation-states have recognized economic, social, and cultural principles
as human rights in international legal documents, western democracies have been
reluctant to institutionalize methods for progressively achieving and monitoring those
rights. In this thesis, I focus on the practical implementation of economic, social, and
cultural rights, and I argue that such principles can be recognized as justiciable rights in
national constitutions.6 To understand the modern rights framework, I first analyze why
the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights is justified, including a brief
overview of the historical and philosophical role of rights. Second, I argue that other
types of recognition inadequately address implementation problems, and constitutional
recognition provides unique advantages not present in other alternatives. Third, I address
a significant objection to the constitutionalization of economic, social, and cultural
rights—whether such rights can be justiciable.
Justiciability concerns—concerns about whether such rights can have adequate
and appropriate remedies—are probably the greatest barrier to the practical
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights. A study of recent South African
jurisprudence (specifically, the cases of the Government of the Republic of South Africa
v. Grootboom7 and Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign8), however,
provides a preliminary model for other countries to follow. By analyzing this approach, I
argue that such rights can be practically achievable through constitutionalization.

6

Throughout the thesis, I use “constitution” to refer to both constitutions and (stand-alone) national bills
of rights.
7
Gov. of the Republic of S. Afr. v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
8
Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
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Specifically, the new South African Constitution protects several economic, social, and
cultural rights; and its Constitutional Court has been willing to provide citizens with
limited redressability. Under its approach, rather than asking if the right, itself, was
violated, the South African Constitutional Court evaluates whether government action
was reasonable in relation to the right at issue. This approach maintains the balance of
powers within government, and it also provides practical value to economic, social, and
cultural rights for individual citizens by giving them a means of redressability.
Because the South African example demonstrates that justiciably cognizable
constitutionalization of economic, social, and cultural rights is feasible, it provides other
nations with a preliminary model to follow in crafting the best practical method of
implementing these rights, thereby providing citizens with a means of redress at the
domestic level and directing governments to prioritize these fundamental principles.
Lastly, I note that the South African example is not the only possibility. Rather,
scholars should continue to consider new options and evaluate alternative
constitutionalization schemes for progressively achieving these rights in the twenty-first
century.
II.

Theoretical Background

The position that economic, social, and cultural rights should be constitutionalized
rests upon the contention that practical implementation of economic, social, and cultural
rights principles is justified. From a purely practical standpoint, 160 nation-states are
parties (i.e. domestic ratification has been completed in those countries) to the 1966

3

International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).9 Unlike the
Universal Declaration, which is an aspirational document, ICESCR is a binding
multilateral treaty under which states assume specific obligations, including the
―progressive[e] . . . realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means.‖10 Hence, each of those 160 nation-states has legally committed itself
to the realization of economic, social, and cultural principles enshrined in ICESCR, and
another 69 countries which have signed the treaty, but not yet domestically ratified it,
have signaled their political support of its principles. From this standpoint, parties to
ICESCR have a legal obligation to pursue practical implementation methods of these
principles; from a legal perspective, states have a compelling reason to pursue practical
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights.
Outside of international legal concerns, the nature of human rights can help shed
light on why economic, social, and cultural principles are moral imperatives; and
therefore, why they should be protected in national constitutions—which enshrine some
of the deepest values of societies. Today, rights are generally understood as theoretical
constructs that confer entitlements to right-holders and duties to the corresponding dutybearers.11 Duties may include obligations of non-interference (such as in the case of
some civil and political rights), positive burdens to adequately provide certain basic
human entitlements (such as in the case of some economic, social, and cultural rights), or

9

United Nations, "Chapter IV: Human Rights" 29 Nov. 2010, United Nations Treaty Collection,
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en>.
10
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Preamble (3 Jan. 1976), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
11
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, ed. Walter Cook
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919) 38.

4

both. Human rights are properly considered a subset of rights, which grant particular
entitlements to all humans based upon their humanity.
As Louis Henkin has observed, ―international human rights are not the work of
philosophers, but of politicians and citizens, and philosophers have only begun to try to
build conceptual justifications for them.‖12 Nevertheless, rights conceptions can help
explain why such rights are moral imperatives.
In the 16th century, the Protestant Reformation swept Europe, creating Protestant
denominations, separate from the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic
Church‘s schism allowed Europeans to exercise a measure of religious choice, and the
division eventually helped to secularize Europe.13 In its 17th century aftermath, Europe
was forced to reconcile a newly pluralistic religious society. The fall of the Roman
Catholic Church‘s religious monopoly and corresponding political power gave rise to
new political concepts such as the ―divine right of kings.‖14 Recognizing problems posed
by religious diversity, philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke began to
conceptualize new political theories on the limits of state power framed in terms of
―rights.‖15 Since then, rights have been understood as particular political demands
against the state which mediate the relationship between the collective and the individual

12

Philip Harvey, “Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights
Seriously,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 33 (2002): 390–401, 390.
13
Steven Kreis, "Lecture 3: The Protestant Reformation," The History Guide: Lectures on Early Modern
European History. 19 Dec. 2010 <http://www.historyguide.org/earlymod/lecture3c.html>.
14
Richard Hooker, "Divine Right of Kings," The European Enlightenment Glossary. 19 Dec. 2010 <
http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/DIVRIGHT.HTM>.
15
Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan,” The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (London: John Bohn, 1839); John
Locke, “The Second Treatise of Government,” The Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul: Paragon, 2001)
72.

5

(either alone or as part of a distinct—usually minority—group).16 As such, these
foundational rights recognized by a society express a society‘s core beliefs and values
regarding the relationship between the individual and the state.17
As one of the 17th century‘s central thinkers, John Locke introduced a theory of
natural rights. He appealed to an ―omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker‖18 as the creator
―of natural equality.‖19 For Locke, humans are born into a pre-political ―state of nature,‖
where each individual enjoys ―perfect freedom.‖20 Individuals in this state are limited
only by the ―law of Nature‖ which treats all humans as equal and independent.21 The law
of Nature prescribes that no individual can harm the life, health, liberty, and possessions
of any other individual,22 thereby giving individuals certain inalienable natural rights.23
This law is equally accessible to individuals because it only can be discovered through
reason, endowed to all humans.24 Because of disorder in the state of nature, humans form
a social contract consenting to transfer their rights to governments to mutually protect
their life, liberty, and property.25 Yet this transfer of power to the government is not

16

Jeanne M. Woods, “Rights as Slogans: A Theory of Human Rights Based on African Humanism,” National
Black Law Journal 17 (2002–2004): 52–66, 52.
17
Woods, 52.
18
Locke, 72–73.
19
Andrew Reeve, “John Locke,” Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, eds. Iain McLean and Alistair
McMillan, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 316.
20
Locke, 72.
21
Locke, 72–73.
22
Locke, 72–73.
23
Constitutional Rights Foundation, "Natural Rights," Constitutional Rights Foundation 19 Dec. 2010
<http://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/natural-rights.html>.
24
"Locke's Political Philosophy," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 29 July 2010
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/>.
25
Locke, 75.
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absolute; it is recognized as valid only as long as the government uses the power to
protect individual, natural rights.26
Locke used the idea of natural rights to express ―the idea that there were certain
moral truths that applied to all people, regardless of the particular place where they lived
or the agreements they had made.‖27 This approach embraced pluralism by requiring the
state to recognize liberty of conscience, including religious tolerance.28 Inherent in this
approach is a commitment to liberty through freedom of conscience.
In the 18th century during the Scottish Enlightenment, thinkers such as David
Hume took a more optimistic view of human nature. Hume embraced a natural ―moral
sense‖ or ―sentiment‖ which was ―more properly felt than judg'd‖ as the core of
morality.29 As the Enlightenment spread across Europe to America, humanitarianism
would become one of its trademarks.30 The Enlightenment expanded upon the
importance of freedom of conscience inherent in Locke‘s philosophy. The
Enlightenment view held that if humans were free to exercise their reason, they would
naturally act with respect to the welfare of others, for they were essentially moral,
rational beings.31 Furthermore, they had unique inherent qualities and abilities.32

26

Patrick Hayden, The Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul: Paragon, 2001) 71.
"Locke's Political Philosophy," <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/>.
28
See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Huddersfield: J. Brook, 1796). This religious tolerance
did not extend to atheists (who would not swear legally binding oaths) and Catholics (who were loyal to a
foreign power). Jim Powell, "John Locke Natural Rights to Life, Liberty and Property," The Freeman: Ideas
on Liberty,20 Dec 2010 <http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/john-locke-natural-rights-to-lifeliberty-and-property/>.
29
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888)
470.
30
Hackett Lewis, "The Age of Enlightenment," International World History Project 20 Dec. 2010
<http://history-world.org/age_of_enlightenment.htm>.
31
Lewis, <http://history-world.org/age_of_enlightenment.htm>.
32
Paul Gingrich, “Notes on the Enlightenment and Liberalism,” University of Regina Department of
Sociology and Social Studies 20 Dec. 2010 <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/en318f02.htm>.
27
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Accordingly, moral conduct ―required freedom from needless restraints.‖33 Because
one‘s humanness relies on one‘s moral sense and rational thought (which, in turn,
requires autonomy and intrinsic freedom), a core measure of liberty is essential for its
realization. Conversely, without liberty and autonomy, rational beings could not flourish;
therefore state power must be limited to ensure freedom for individuals to thrive and
realize their humanness. This fundamental optimism concerning human nature was
reflected in the thought of Americans Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine,
and George Mason,34 and consequently in the United States‘ founding documents and its
Bill of Rights.35
In the 19th century, Karl Marx and other socialist thinkers would contemplate
how capitalism economically and socially exploited wage laborers to create profit. Marx
would argue that capitalism created a segmented society marked by vast inequalities of
wealth and power, where the working class experienced oppressive working and social
conditions.36 Natural rights had focused on restricting government power, but these types
of rights were insufficient to ―achiev[e] positive human emancipation‖ from the problems
of capitalism.37 These ideas were also reflected in the United States in both the
Progressive Era and the New Deal social welfare policies that were designed to address
the inequities and unfairness of industrial capitalism.38 Because of the thinking of Marx
and other socialists, the list of rights expanded ―well beyond those proposed by the early

33

Lewis, <http://history-world.org/age_of_enlightenment.htm>.
E.g. Charles B. Sanford, The Religious Life of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville: University of Virginia
Press, 1984) 20–21.
35
See U.S. Constitution; see also U.S. Declaration of Independence.
36
Patrick Hayden, “Karl Marx,” The Philosophy of Human Rights (St. Paul: Paragon, 2001) 126.
37
Hayden, 126–127.
38
"Social Legislation," Gale Encylopedia of US History, 20 Dec. 2010
<http://www.answers.com/topic/social-legislation>.
34
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social contact theorists.‖39 Because the abuse of power by private, economic entities
could be as dangerous as the state‘s abuse of power, this line of thought found historical
civil and political rights were insufficient because they only limited state action. Rather
than merely restricting government action, the government also had to proactively protect
individuals from the perils inherent in capitalism.
Trends in rights thought would change significant with the rise of the social
sciences; contemporary philosophers would reject a hallmark idea of the
Enlightenment—that the moral sense inherent in all individuals could reveal moral truth
through free and open discussion.40 Rather, 19th and 20th century philosophers
increasingly recognized that humans were socially constructed.41 Because contemporary
philosophy views individuals as historical and social constructs, there is no longer
agreement about human nature and the natural, moral sense. This broke ―the link
between truth and justifiability.‖42
Modern philosophers have dealt with this lack of objective moral foundation in
various ways. For instance, among important contemporary philosophers, John Rawls
accepts that ―as a practical political matter no general moral conception can provide the
basis for a public conception of justice in a modern democratic society.‖43 Rather than
searching for an objective moral foundation, he believes a liberal democracy may thrive

39

Hayden, 127.
Richard Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom
eds. Merrill D. Peterson and Robert C. Vaughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 258.
41
Rorty, 258.
42
Rorty, 258.
43
John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985):
225.
40
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using an ―overlapping consensus.‖44 This avoids disagreements regarding religion and
philosophy by forming a consensus among diverse citizens on a core of commitments.
Thus, Rawls believes, pluralistic societies can find pragmatic solutions to disagreements;
rather than arguing about justifications, the justification simply becomes the consensus.
Under this view, rights become instrumentally important for a multitude of reasons.
In the same manner that Rawls discussed, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights
served as a signal that the international community had agreed pragmatically that
economic, social, and cultural rights were important. Under the contemporary view, a
shared objective foundation is unnecessary; the Universal Declaration signifies a
consensus that diverse people, regardless of their moral commitments and their social
construction, could agree that economic, social, and cultural rights were important
enough, normatively, to be designated as core political commitments.
Finally, in addition to pragmatic justifications, the concurrent realization of civil
and political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights is crucial to the functional
fulfillment of both types of rights because they are fundamentally interdependent. From
the time of the Universal Declaration, both types of human rights have been recognized
by the international community as interrelated and interdependent. Sandra Fredman
notes:

44

Rawls, 225–226.
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Without basic socio-economic entitlements, civil and political rights cannot be
fully exercised. Freedom of speech or assembly are of little use to a starving or
homeless person. Equally problematically, those without resources will find it
hard to access the legal system to redress breaches of their rights . . . . The
interaction also works in the other direction . . . . As Sen has argued . . . .
[f]reedom of the press, a free opposition, and freedom of information ‗spread the
penalty of famine to the ruling groups.‘45
In effect, civil and political rights have little practical meaning without the support of
basic economic, social, and cultural rights. The realization of economic, social, and
cultural rights affects the realization of civil and political rights, and this makes them
instrumentally valuable in attaining civil and political rights, and the reverse is also true.
Promoting one type of right can enhance and promote the other type. Because civil and
political rights are intimately tied to the enjoyment of social, economic, and cultural
rights (and vice versa), the concurrent realization of both types of rights is important.
Although this thesis is not designed to defend a particular theoretical view of
rights because it focuses on the normative function of economic, social, and cultural
rights, it is based upon the premise that such rights are imperatives because 1) they are
international legal commitments; 2) the international community has pragmatically
agreed that they are moral imperatives; and 3) they are instrumentally important for the
fulfillment of civil and political rights. Thus, finding achievable methods of practical
realization is important for all governments.
II.

Forms of Recognition

There are many modes of recognizing economic, social, and, cultural rights. This
section examines strategies for recognizing economic, social, and cultural rights. It

45

Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 67.
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argues that although strategies which do not involve constitutionalization may provide
certain practical benefits, they insufficiently address problems with the implementation of
such rights. In effect, full realization of these rights may include other means of practical
recognition, but justiciable constitutionalization can effectively address many practical
concerns. Constitutionalization is an important method of practical implementation.
Although these other means of recognition can fill in some of the gaps not addressed by
constitutionalization, they cannot fully replace the constitutionalization of economic,
social, and cultural rights.
a. Informal Recognition
Recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights may be either informal (nonlegal) or formal (legal). Informal recognition includes work encompassed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and advocates, in both domestic and international
contexts. Even though such work is necessary to the realization of economic, social, and
cultural rights, it is not satisfactory. Informal actors intervene only when local, state,
national, and international governments are unable or unwilling to provide basic
economic, social, and cultural rights. As such, they are temporary ―fixes‖ to
governmental inaction.
Informal recognition includes many drawbacks when used as an exclusive
strategy to address economic, social, and cultural rights. Informal actors are often solely
funded through private donations; consequently, their resources are far more limited than
government entities. Moreover, they may support specific agendas, antithetical to the
diversity of liberal democracies, or favor specific groups, limiting equal access to
resources. Hence, informal recognition does not ensure equal fulfillment of economic,
12

social, and cultural rights nor does it guarantee such rights at all; it merely helps address
some temporary economic, social, and cultural concerns.
In this situation, informal recognition does not help establish the primacy of such
rights because it is informal; in the next section I will argue that only formal legal
recognition can help re-order societal values, establishing the primacy and urgency of
economic, social, and cultural rights and helping ensure the necessary foundation for the
concurrent realization of civil and political rights. Furthermore, formal legal recognition
prioritizes these rights as legitimate government concerns.
b. Formal Recognition
i. International Recognition
Formal recognition can happen on both the international and domestic levels. As
pointed out in the introduction, economic, social, and cultural rights have already gained
international recognition. Such rights were first recognized as global aspirations in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted unanimously by the United Nations on
December 10, 1948.46 Eighteen years later, the United Nations adopted two treaties to
implement the various aspects of the Universal Declaration—the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).47 Since then, there have been numerous
international treaties dealing with different aspects of economic, social, and cultural
rights. Yet, as discussed below, international recognition is insufficient for two reasons:

46

There were, however, eight abstentions. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights, 2nd ed.
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003) 22.
47
Paul G. Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2003) 244.
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first, international implementation for all rights is relatively weak; second, international
recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights is even weaker than international
recognition of civil and political rights.
International recognition is important because it helps emphasize the universal
nature of such rights across cultures, and it provides states with legal commitments to
pursue them. Furthermore, it enables states to use the weight of international consensus
as a political argument to pressure other states into specific practices. Thus, international
recognition works for the realization of rights in key ways.
However, although traditional international legal structures can provide some
remedies, such as international condemnation against rights violators, in many cases, it
cannot adequately rectify internal human rights violations—this is true for both civil and
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. Regrettably, international
bodies are notoriously weak enforcement entities, and the principle of state sovereignty
often protects violator states. For instance, the United Nations Assembly defined South
Africa's program of apartheid as a danger to international peace and security in a
resolution in 1961.48 In 1985, the Security Council urged members to participate in
sports and cultural embargoes, suspend loans, prohibit certain trade with South Africa,
and suspend new investment.49 Yet apartheid did not formally end until 1994, largely as
a result of both internal and external pressure. Because sovereignty often dominates
international relations, states may claim reservations to international treaties, refuse to

48

"The UN and Apartheid: A Chronology," UN Chronicle, 1 Sept. 1994, United Nations Publications,
<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-16435074.html>.
49
“The UN and Apartheid,” <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-16435074.html>.
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acknowledge the authority of international monitoring bodies, or assert exemptions based
on emergency circumstances.
Even where there is international implementation of economic, social, and
cultural rights, it has been much weaker and less effective than the international
implementation of civil and political rights. For instance, the implementation structure of
ICCPR (which protects civil and political rights) provided for the creation of the Human
Rights Committee, an independent U.N. body which oversees a reporting procedure.50
ICESCR (which protects economic, social, and cultural rights), on the other hand,
originally provided for implementation by the United Nations‘ Economic and Social
Council.51 Hence, although ICCPR was overseen by an independent body, ICESCR was
overseen by a political body of the United Nations.52 The importance of an independent
review body cannot be over-emphasized. Independent bodies have the freedom to
criticize violator practices, regardless of which state is doing the violating, the nature of
the violations, or the political ramifications of such criticism. Political bodies, on the
other hand, are constrained by government policies and political agendas. An
independent body has the duty to report fairly and accurately on violations, whenever and
wherever they occur, but political bodies are made of political actors constrained by their
national interests. Such political interests are often at odds with reporting on states‘
internal violations, and politics may preclude state actors from reporting on violations of
other states. Because of these considerations, political bodies are unsuited to the role of a

50

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part IV.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Part IV.
52
See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Part IV.
51
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transparent review body. Transparency requires independence, and politically
constrained bodies simply are not independent because they are harnessed to politics.53
Furthermore, ICCPR‘s implementation structure provides for reporting
procedures and inter-state grievance petitions,54 but ICESCR only provides for a
reporting procedure.55 Because ICESCR does not provide for an inter-state grievance
process, it is much weaker than ICCPR. Reporting procedures are content-neutral
procedural requirements. In effect, ICESCR mandates a procedure—periodic
reporting—but does not review substantive content for violations. The procedural
requirement of progress reports does not mandate any specific progressive realization of
economic, social, and cultural rights, nor does it address new violations by states. If such
a progress report read ―not applicable‖ or ―no progress,‖ there is little the Economic and
Social Council can do because only the report itself is required under the Covenant.
On the other hand, ICCPR allows an inter-state grievance procedure. This
enables the Human Rights Committee to review whether the substantive actions of a state
are in accord with the covenant. Unfortunately, only states can bring civil and political
complaints before the Human Rights Committee, which relegates even these grievances
to the political process. However, although ICCPR‘s implementation procedures could
also be stronger, at least its supervisory body can review substantive violations in some
capacity.
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This dualistic approach to these two types of rights, which allows a means of
substantive redressability for political and civil rights but which relegates economic,
social, and cultural rights entirely to the political realm, treats civil and political rights as
justiciable and economic, social, and cultural rights as merely aspirational.56 The idea of
justiciability is a complex one, and the next section will discuss it in more detail. Laying
aside a detailed discussion of justiciability for the moment, the discrepancies between
ICESCR and ICCPR allow a generalized means of redressability on the nation-state level
for civil and political rights; but economic, social, and cultural rights rely solely on a
reporting procedure.
Even noting the disparity between ICESCR and ICCPR, neither covenant
adequately rectifies internal human rights violations of nation-states on the international
level; both covenants could go farther in protecting such rights. Neither covenant
currently allows individuals or non governmental entities to report substantive violations.
Thus, there is no apparatus to review substantive violations without the political support
of a state, which can report it on behalf of a body or individual, subject to its political
will. Even if the covenants did allow individuals to report significant violations,
however, state sovereignty significantly curtails any means of redressability beyond
international condemnation. Although international condemnation can be a useful tool, it
cannot adequately address rights violations in many circumstances. This is true of all
rights, both civil and political rights57 and economic, social, and cultural rights.
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In short, international enforcement efforts of economic, social, and cultural rights
have failed to secure such rights for global citizens. In the future, even if there will be an
enforceable international instrument58 to help address violations of such rights, it will still
be subject to domestic remedy processes. Although international enforcement efforts
remain important, they are not sufficient for the practical implementation of economic,
social, and cultural rights. Because most international instruments require domestic
remedies to be exhausted before an international claim can be made, addressing human
rights at a domestic level is the quickest route to redress for individuals, and it is
undoubtedly the most effective method of enforcing these rights.
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ii. Domestic Recognition
Even though international implementation is crucial, domestic implementation is
more effective for individuals whose rights have been violated. As Claire Archbold
notes, ―a human rights culture will only really be created in a particular society if human
rights are incorporated into its national law.‖59 Domestic implementation is critical to the
progressive realization of economic, social, and cultural rights because only governments
have the national structure, resources, and power to help realize such rights. Eric Posner
has noted that ―law without government exists at the international level, law normally
requires courts to interpret and enforce it, effective courts cannot exist without supporting
government institutions, no such institutions exist at the international level. In the
absence of effective international courts, the next best thing is the domestic court, which
can at least apply the law and enforce it—and maybe advance it.‖60
In addition, unlike international protection, domestic protection can proactively
protect and fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights. Constitutional provisions and
statutory implementation can ensure positive action toward fulfilling such rights.
Furthermore, unlike international apparatuses that are subject to extensive bureaucracy,
the protective shroud of national sovereignty, and few substantial remedies, domestic
protection can offer efficient and (comparatively) timely remedies for individuals whose
rights have been violated.
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There are two main types of domestic solution: first, through adoption into
ordinary law (statutes); or second, through national constitutions. I argue below that even
though statutory protection can be an effective method of ensuring economic, social, and
cultural rights, this is not the best method. Rather, express constitutional provisions offer
a much better fit for economic, social, and cultural rights because it does not subject them
to political whims. It enshrines such rights as broad principles which can be shaped to a
variety of circumstances; it properly counterbalances the autonomous side of human
nature as conceived in civil and political rights; it serves to awaken national human rights
consciousness; and it can provide a method of redress for citizens.
1. Statutory Protection
Statutory protection is relatively easily implemented by states and can adequately
ensure proactive protection of rights. However, the ease of enacting ordinary law is also
its drawback—for it is just as easily changed and modified.61 Ordinary law is subject to
political whims and changing political majorities. Those who lack the most basic
economic, social, and cultural concerns usually also lack political power.62 Conversely,
those who have political power may lack the urgent need to address economic, social, and
cultural rights. Implementation of rights in ordinary law is entirely subject to political
will which may be entirely lacking. This is contrary to the notion of a human right; for
rights should not be dependent on political will for their realization. Politically enacted
privileges, such as tax cuts, can freely be given or taken away by political majorities in
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response to current economics, politics, customs, or other societal concerns. Because
human rights, as I have defined them above, are moral entitlements based on an
agreement, they should not be subject to such political trends. Thus, there is a marked
difference between politically enacted privileges and human rights, where the latter
requires firmer establishment.
There is also a marked difference between statutory implementation and
constitutional implementation in terms of the language of the right. Constitutions
enshrine broad principles whereas statutes address particular problems. Writer James
McClellan notes that a ―constitution should be concerned with first principles of
government; it should not be an endeavor to provide rules of administration for a
multitude of concerns.63 Constitutions are meant to protect generally applicable
principles which allow the branches of government the necessary leeway to interpret
those principles in view of particular situations. Thus, constitutions enshrine ―thin‖ or
universally applicable principles, which allows the branches of government to ―thicken‖
or contour the constitutional principles to particular situations. Statutory implementation,
on the other hand, is already ―thickened‖ through the political process. Ordinary laws
have already been contoured to the political and economic atmosphere at the time. In this
sense, ordinary law is reactionary; it lags behind changing situations, whereas
constitutional recognition fully encompasses the right by defining it in broad language.
Statutory implementation, therefore, can be subject to reactionary gaps where aspects of
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the right are not, in fact, protected. In such an instance, an individual has no opportunity
for redress and instead falls prey to a gap created by changing circumstances.
Lastly, with regard to statutory legislation, there is a disconnect in the approach of
many western countries, which relegate economic, social, and cultural rights entirely to
ordinary law while protecting civil and political rights in their constitutions. This
approach treats economic, social, and cultural rights as second-class rights, yet rights (of
any kind) have ―never been fully achievable in the absence of laws which do establish
them as constitutional rights available to individual citizens.‖64 For all of these reasons,
economic, social, and cultural rights should be enshrined as constitutional provisions.
2. Constitutional Recognition
a. Aspirational Recognition
Within constitutional documents, there are two types of cognizable recognition—
aspirational (partial) recognition and justiciable (full) recognition. Constitutions may
distinguish between principles that are purely aspirational and those which are
redressable through judicial action. Some countries, such as India and Ireland, have
chosen to treat economic, social, and cultural rights as purely directive principles for
political action.65 Even in this capacity, such recognition is important, because it may
help shape government priorities. However, if political majorities completely disregard
aspirational principles, there is no recourse against the government or the state, other than
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democratically changing the majority through elections. Although partial constitutional
recognition is better than simply disregarding economic, social, and cultural rights, it is
relatively ineffective method for the practical realization of such rights.
Whether principles in constitutions are fully or partially recognized, they can play
a pivotal role in national consciousness, and their provisions can generate significant
public endorsement. In other words, constitutional recognition has ―myth-making
potential.‖66 In this capacity, they can help build a national human rights consciousness.
They can serve as guiding principles which help awaken human rights consciousness
within the nation. They also may serve as educational tools, instilling the importance of
foundational ethical principles in all citizens. Used in this way, the memorialization of
human rights in constitutional documents helps cement the importance of protecting
rights and fosters greater human rights awareness and sensitivity. People value principles
enshrined in their constitution, and they talk about their constitutional rights with a deep
gravity. Principles enshrined in a constitution can form ―a statement of how a country
imagines itself.‖67 This statement can and should include recognition of the foundational
principles of human nature, both the human need for liberty and autonomy and human
social obligations. However, without full recognition, people may be more ambivalent
about constitutional principles. As stated at the beginning of the thesis, rights are
entitlements that have corresponding duties, but when duties become optional, they are
no longer properly considered ―duties;‖ therefore economic, social, and cultural rights are
reduced to mere guiding principles, rather than rights. Certainly, there seems to be a
marked difference in the gravity with which individuals might talk about their ―right to

66
67

Archbold, 73.
Archbold, 73.

23

free speech‖ (a justiciable right in the U.S. Constitution) as opposed to ―ensuring
domestic tranquility‖ (part of the aspirational preamble of the U.S. Constitution). Even
though both may have some myth-making value, the redressability of the former lends it
credence and weight lacking from the latter. In other words, fully recognized rights can
serve as educational tools and help build human rights consciousness, like aspirational
goals, but fully recognized rights are more effective as educational tools and
consciousness-builders because they are taken more seriously on account of their
redressability. Although enshrining economic, social, and cultural rights in constitutions
can serve important purposes even without enforcement mechanisms, this approach does
not realize their potential because it robs such rights of their gravity.
As French jurist Karel Vasak noted, many economic, social, and cultural rights
―can only be implemented by the combined efforts of everyone: individuals, states and
other bodies, as well as public and private institutions.‖68 Although all of the methods of
recognition discussed in this section are desirable on some level, none of them can
adequately protect economic, social, and cultural rights without full constitutional
protection. Informal recognition only serves as a reactionary—and often imbalanced—
response to the gravest violations (such as a lack of food in emergency situations).
Formal recognition on the international level has failed to secure these rights because of a
lack of political willpower to make them priorities and because of the very structure of
the nation-state system, which protects countries from interference in their domestic
activities through the idea of national sovereignty. Partial recognition on the domestic
level which deprives economic, social, and cultural principles of the status of a ―right‖ by
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making duties optional fails to protect them adequately and fails to maximize their human
rights consciousness-building potential. Thus, the real success of these rights lies in full
constitutional recognition and implementation.
III.

Justiciable Constitutional Recognition

In the preceding sections, I discussed why other methods of implementation are
not adequate alternatives to the constitutionalization of economic, social, and cultural
rights. As noted in the previous section, there are excellent reasons to memorialize
economic, social, and cultural rights in constitutions apart from their justiciability. As
guiding principles which can awaken human rights consciousness, they can serve
important purposes even without enforcement mechanisms. This approach nonetheless
does not realize the promise of equalizing economic, social, and cultural rights with
political and civil rights. Full justiciable constitutionalization69 provides the most
effective method for ensuring such rights because it addresses a critical need for
implementation at the domestic level. Constitutional rights are much more difficult to
change than ordinary legislation, so they are not liable to political trends. They serve
both as principles which build human rights consciousness in a nation as well as—
importantly—rights able to be judicially protected, thereby giving such rights functional
meaning to individuals.
This type of constitutional recognition of economic, social, and cultural rights
acknowledges that such rights impose real world obligations on all members of the
human race. These real world obligations are important because they stabilize the
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community and provide a network of basic support which ensures that individuals have
the freedom to realize the autonomous part of their nature. Furthermore, they provide an
aspirational and an actionable framework, balancing both human freedom and human
duties to others.
The justiciable entrenchment of economic, social, and cultural rights is also
important because courts are charged with upholding the rule of law, including equality,
fairness, and justice. They ground their decisions in constitutional principles because the
constitution represents a social compact between citizens on which government is
founded. Placing economic, social, and cultural rights in constitutions directs all
branches of the government—including courts—to weigh the values inherent in these
rights when applying the law to particular situations. By constitutionalizing them, society
directs courts to take these rights into account when balancing other needs of the
community.
Lastly, judicial protection of economic, social, and cultural rights is critical
because it gives individuals a remedy when the government fails to honor those rights.
As the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations commented, ―[i]n relation to
civil and political rights, it is generally taken for granted that judicial remedies for
violations are essential. Regrettably, the contrary assumption is made in relation to
economic, social, and cultural rights.‖70 Enforcement gives effect to rights, and it ensures
their adherence by governments. Because the public-at-large has a means of
redressability. the government is forced to prioritize economic, social, and cultural rights,
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and citizens have a method of realizing these rights when the government does not live
up to its responsibility. Rights require corresponding duties and obligations; otherwise,
they are mere goals. Without adequate redressability, these rights lose their practical
value for individuals in the real world.
Yet, as the Economist noted in 2001, ―[u]p to now Western human-rights
campaigners have left economic and social concerns to humanitarians and
philanthropists. When they have taken an interest in economic and social conditions, it
has been merely to strengthen the case for political crusading.‖71 So why have these
types of rights eluded practical implementation? In part, they fell victim to political
realities and historical circumstances of the twentieth century. These rights also differed
in significant ways from the more traditional civil and political rights, and these
differences created great practical challenges. For instance, economic, social, and
cultural rights may require significant economic investment for their realization. Indeed,
some objectors note, a resource-scarce country may have to ignore some rights as a
matter of economic necessity.72
Those who recognize the value of economic, social, and cultural rights yet who
still protest constitutionalization do so for one overarching reason: they believe the liberal
political state‘s judicial branch is not designed to protect rights which appear to require
significant political decision-making, as this would infringe on the balance of powers
among government branches. To enforce such rights and provide adequate remedies,
critics argue, judiciaries would be forced to make political decisions, such as how to
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allocate scarce resources between ideological goods. If the judiciary encroaches on
legislative power by making political decisions, it threatens to upset the balance of power
among government branches. Because modern governance models rely on the balance of
power among branches, the separation of power is vital to the harmony of the entire
governmental system. In effect, opponents of constitutionalization argue that if courts
have the power to offer means of redressability concerning economic, social, and cultural
rights, they will have an ―an overriding veto power‖ against the legislative branch. 73
Indeed, even when such rights have been constitutionalized, ―courts have generally been
unwilling to get into social policy.‖74 For instance, the New Zealand Court of Appeals
noted that it would be ‗―less inclined to intervene‖ in social and economic rights because
―complex social and economic considerations and trade-offs were involved.‖‘75 How
then can courts adequately address economic, social, and cultural rights?
The answer lies in the ―reasonable‖ approach adopted by the South African
Constitutional Court. The Court treats economic, social, and cultural rights much as it
would review administrative decisions, evaluating whether government action was
reasonable in relation to the right at issue. This administrative approach to economic,
social, and cultural rights maintains the balance of power among governmental branches
because it does not dictate redressability for the actual right; rather the court can
adjudicate only the government‘s rational pursuit of that right. Thus, the legislative
branch retains the power to craft any implementation of the right that it sees fit, as long as
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it is reasonable. If the legislative branch fails to implement the right at all or if it does so
in an unreasonable manner, the court can force it to revisit the issue and craft a new,
reasonable solution. The court may decide what factors the legislative branch must
address for the solution to be ―reasonable,‖ but it will not dictate a particular approach;
rather, it will allow the legislative branch to construct any reasonable method for ensuring
the implementation of the right. This thesis will show, below, that this approach
addresses the central concern of critics because it ensures the balance of power among
governmental branches is preserved. Using such a method, courts do not dictate a
particular method or action to the legislative branch, but they do force the legislative
branch to pursue these rights in a rational manner.
a. The South African Experience
The same year of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,76 a coalition
composed of the Reunified National Party and the Afrikaner Party of South Africa
enacted the apartheid laws, which institutionalized a system of racial discrimination in
South Africa.77 Reinforcing decades of informal racism, the 1948 government
systematized the separation of the races in the economic, political, social, and educational
sectors.78 White dominance was solidified by depriving blacks and coloureds of land,
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education, and resources.79 The South African Constitutional Court noted that during
apartheid, ―[r]ace was the basic, all-pervading and inescapable criterion for participation
by a person in aspects of political and social life.‖80 Grave and systematic government–
sanctioned human rights violations would occur from 1948 until the dismantling of
apartheid in 1994.81 Indeed, "apartheid was . . . chiefly a matter of . . . concrete and
material violence and exploitation."82 This included detention without trial, restriction of
movement, torture, killings, and other repressive tactics, violating both civil and political
human rights and economic, social, and cultural human rights.83
After decades of apartheid and following an interim 1994 constitution, South
Africa adopted a new constitution in 1996. This constitution later included several
fundamental economic, social, and cultural rights.84 In arguing for the inclusion of
economic, social, and cultural rights, the chair of the African National Congress‘
Constitutional Committee, Zola Skweylya, stated that ―[w]e do not want freedom without
bread, nor do we want bread without freedom.‖85 Albie Sachs, later a Constitutional
Court Justice, would also argue for a broader vision of rights, promoting the idea that
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rights are mechanisms for ―orderly, progressive, and rapid change in the direction of real
equality‖ rather than mere checks against government powers.86
The new South African Constitution has been credited with helping build South
Africa‘s ―rainbow nation‖87 (a colloquial South African expression reflecting the plurality
of the country‘s ethnic makeup), and it was heavily influenced by the Universal
Declaration, ICCPR, and ICESCR.88 The South African Constitution includes economic,
social, and cultural rights such as the right of access to adequate housing;89 the right to
have access to health care services, sufficient food and water, and social security;90 the
right to a basic education;91 the right to use the language of one‘s choice and participate
in the cultural life of one‘s choice;92 and the right to an environment which is not harmful
to one‘s health or well-being.93 Many of these rights were direct responses to abuses of
power during the apartheid era.94 In addition to the backward looking provisions
designed to address apartheid-era transgressions, the Constitution also looks toward the
future. Labeled a ―transformative constitution,‖ Karl Klare called the South African
Constitution ―an enterprise of inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent
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political processes grounded in law.‖95 The South African Constitution is the result of
―the first deliberate and calculated effort in history to craft a human rights state—a polity
that is primarily animated by human rights norms.‖96
This constitutional experiment by South Africa has created a new vision of how
such rights can be implemented. The South African Constitutional Court‘s decisions can
help guide other countries in the implementation and redressability of economic, social,
and cultural rights. The Court‘s decisions address the lack of precedent in the area of
redressability of social, economic, and cultural rights. In addition, the South African
experience provides a helpful roadmap for other countries that wish to give these rights
real meaning in constitutional settings.
i. The Grootboom Decision: Adjudicating Reasonableness
Segregation of land started long before formal apartheid. In 1913, the Native
Land Act became law, creating territorial segregation.97 It created land reserves for
blacks and prohibited the sale of land by whites to blacks who could only live outside the
land reserves if they could prove that they were in white employment.98 The segregation
policies were expanded under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, which implemented
mechanisms for the removal of black landowners outside the reserves.99 In the 1950s,
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segregation again expanded as black South Africans were subdivided ethnically and
linguistically, and then they were placed on separate homelands.100 In the years that
followed, the government practiced ―influx control‖ in urban areas, granting employment
and housing preferences to coloureds (individuals of mixed white and black heritage) and
excluding black people.101 In spite of housing freezes for blacks in the Western Cape,
blacks continued to move into the area in search of employment, and they were forced to
move into squatter settlements characterized by inadequate housing, overcrowding, and
government harassment.102 By the time the Interim Constitution was adopted in 1994,
there was a shortage of more than 100,000 housing units in the Cape Metro.103 In
addition, hundreds of thousands of others occupied rudimentary shelters.104
In 1999, Irene Grootboom and others were evicted from their "informal homes"
on private land which had been earmarked for formal low-cost housing.105 Previously,
Grootboom and others had lived in Wallacedene, one of the informal squatter settlements
on the fringe of the Cape Metro.106 A quarter of Wallacedene's residents had no income,
and more than two-thirds of the residents earned less than 500 rand per month.107 Half
the individuals living in Wallacedene were children, and all individuals in Wallacedene
lived in sub-standard housing.108 Wallacedene was partially flooded during seasonal
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rains, and it had no refuse, sewage, or water services.109 Only five percent of
Wallacedene‘s shacks had electricity.110 Grootboom and her extended family lived
together in a shack ―about twenty metres square.‖111 Many individuals living in
Wallacedene had applied for subsidized, low-cost housing, and some had been on the
waiting list for up to seven years.112 Receiving no response from local authorities about
when low-cost housing might be provided, Grootboom and others moved out of
Wallacedene to privately owned, vacant land which was slated to be used for low-cost
housing.113 They did not have the consent of the owner, and he obtained an ejectment
order against them in municipal court; yet their former sites in Wallacedene had been
filled by others.114 At the beginning of winter in 1999, much like government practices
under apartheid, the respondents were forcibly removed, their homes were burnt and their
possessions were destroyed.115 Facing winter rains, the litigants sheltered on a nearby
sports field under plastic sheeting.116 Grootboom and the other litigants requested relief
from the Cape of Good Hope High Court to provide adequate basic shelter or housing
until they could obtain permanent housing.117 A settlement agreement with the
government118 was reached but the government failed to comply with it.119 At the time of
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the decision, the Constitutional Court noted that the case reminded it ―of the intolerable
conditions under which many of our people are still living.‖120
Grounding its decision in Section 26 of the Constitution, which provides the right
of access to adequate housing, the Constitutional Court of South Africa found that the
government was not meeting its constitutional obligations in regards to housing.121 The
Court noted that the Constitution required the government to take positive action to
ameliorate shelter for its citizens.122 It directly addressed the justiciability of economic,
social, and cultural rights, noting that they "are expressly included in the Bill of Rights;
they cannot be said to exist on paper only."123 Previously, when certifying the new
Constitution, the Court had noted that such rights "are, at least to some extent, justiciable
. . . . [M]any of the civil and political rights entrenched in the [constitutional text] will
give rise to similar budgetary implications without compromising their justiciability. The
fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such implications does
not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic
rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion."124 In Grootboom, the Court
added that "[t]he question is therefore not whether socio-economic rights are justiciable
under our Constitution, but how to enforce them in a given case."125
Taking into account the special apartheid circumstances responsible for the
current situation, it found that economic, social, and cultural rights must be understood in
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their social and historical contexts.126 Further noting the clear relationship of the right of
access to housing with other rights and grounding the right in the "foundational values"
of South African society, it stated that the constitutional provision required the state to
take reasonable legislative and other measures within the state‘s available resources and
to achieve the progressive realization of the right to access to housing.127 Hence, the
government had an affirmative obligation to "give effect" to the rights enshrined in it,
rights that could appropriately be enforced by the judicial branch.128 Specifically, the
Court stated that "[t]he state is obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those
living in extreme conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing."129
Although there was legislation in place, the Court found no coherent public
housing program.130 The Court found that the housing program in effect was not
"reasonable" in light of the state's obligation because it failed to give relief to a
significant portion of the population—specifically "those desperately in need of access to
housing"—either in the short term or the long term.131 The Court ordered the government
to meet its obligations by devising, funding, implementing and supervising measures to
provide relief to those in "desperate need."132 Writing for the Court, Justice Zak Yacoob
expounded on the ―reasonableness‖ requirement of the governments duties:
[e]ach sphere of government must accept responsibility for the implementation of
particular parts of the programme but the national sphere of government must
assume responsibility for ensuring that laws, policies, programmes and strategies
are adequate to meet the state‘s section 26 obligations . . . . The measures must
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establish a coherent public housing programme directed towards the progressive
realisation of the right of access to adequate housing within the state‘s available
means. The programme must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right.
The precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily a
matter for the legislature and the executive. They must, however, ensure that the
measures they adopt are reasonable. In any challenge based on section 26 in
which it is argued that the state has failed to meet the positive obligations imposed
upon it by section 26(2), the question will be whether the legislative and other
measures taken by the state are reasonable. A court considering reasonableness
will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have
been adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent. The
question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It
is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted
by the state to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of
reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is
met.133
Here, the Court retains judicial review power over legislative decisions relating to
economic, social, and cultural rights but notes that it will only review legislative
decisions for their reasonableness. Although clearly deferring to the legislative branch
regarding the particulars of implementing standards, the Court also stated that:
[l]egislative measures by themselves are not likely to constitute constitutional
compliance. Mere legislation is not enough. The state is obliged to act to achieve
the intended result, and the legislative measures will invariably have to be
supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and programmes implemented by
the executive. These policies and programmes must be reasonable both in their
conception and their implementation. The formulation of a programme is only the
first stage in meeting the state‘s obligations. The programme must also be
reasonably implemented. An otherwise reasonable programme that is not
implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with the state‘s
obligations.134
In this particular case, the Court noted that a solution must provide for short, medium,
and long-term needs.135 In effect, it noted that a reasonable solution must address each of
these factors; failure to address each factor would make a solution unreasonable. Thus,
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the Court outlined specific government duties while specifying those requirements
broadly enough to preserve the balance of power.
In this landmark decision, the South African Constitutional Court assumed
judicial review over economic, social, and cultural rights, giving them a means of
redressability; and it clarified the role of the judicial branch in determining the
government‘s duties in regard to such rights. A court reviews whether government
measures reasonably facilitate the progression realization of the economic, social, or
cultural right in question. If the court determines the measures are not reasonable, it can
order the legislative branch to craft a new, reasonable solution. It will not substitute its
judgment regarding the details inherent in a particular solution, however; such decisions
are left to the political process. Thus, the reasonableness requirement demands certain
government duties toward economic, social, and cultural rights, but it limits the judicial
review of those government duties to reasonableness, thereby preserving and respecting
the balance of power among government structures. Legislative powers, then, are free to
exercise a measure of political autonomy in crafting solutions, as long as they are within
the bounds of ―reasonableness,‖ as determined by the judicial branch.
The Constitutional Court‘s application of social, economic, and cultural rights in
Grootboom illustrates that such rights can be justiciable while also addressing the
fundamental concerns of those who object to their practical implementation. Rather than
confirming critics‘ fears that such rights are inherently non-justiciable, the South African
Constitutional Court approached economic, social, and cultural rights in an innovative
manner, melding traditional constitutional law with an administrative law approach based
on the reasonability requirement. The Constitutional Court carefully walked a tightrope
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between the enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights and observing the
balance of powers among government branches. This careful balance illustrates that
courts can provide violations of economic, social, and cultural rights with remedies.
Although those remedies may not be as strong as the remedies provided for civil and
political rights, such an approach addresses both the concerns of critics and the
importance of economic, social, and cultural rights.
In addition, the Grootboom case recognized the nuances of providing remedies for
economic, social, and cultural rights. Even though the full enjoyment of an economic,
social, or cultural right relies on—to some extent—the availability of resources, a weak
application of this right still necessitates governmental duties based on the circumstances
of the state in question and the facts of the case. Thus, the Grootboom decision
acknowledged that political decisions must be left up to the political branches of
government, yet it directed the political branches to provide an adequate remedy.
Although the judicial branch may determine certain factors that the legislative branch
must consider for any solution to be ―reasonable,‖ the legislative branch retains the power
to craft any reasonable solution it wishes through its political process. This innovative
approach provides a workable model for other countries to implement economic, social,
and cultural rights as constitutionally protected rights.
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ii. Further Development under the Treatment Action
Campaign Decision
Today, between 15 and 20 percent of adults in South Africa are currently infected
with HIV.136 In 2004, South Africa had 5.3 million HIV-positive people, including 1.7
million people who needed treatment.137 An additional 300,000 South African children
had been orphaned by the AIDS pandemic. 138 Aarthi Belani notes that ―[i]t is no
accident: HIV/AIDS is widespread in South Africa largely because apartheid enforced a
migrant labor system that destabilized family life and conjugal fidelity.‖139 In the sixteen
years since apartheid, the government has had to address deep system inequities—under
apartheid, blacks did not have equal access to medical care; hospitals were segregated;
and blacks were allocated significantly less health funding.140 Because health risks such
as HIV/AIDS were not adequately addressed in the black population under apartheid, its
effects have grown exponentially. In 2003, the Economist noted that ―in the absence of
AIDS, there would be modest economic growth and universal education within three
generations. If nothing is done to combat the epidemic, however, the model predicts a
complete economic collapse within four generations.‖141 The second President of South
Africa, Thabo Mbeki, did not help the plight against this disease. Although an
international consensus shows that AIDS is caused by HIV, Mbeki doubted that
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antiretroviral drugs were effective in treating the disease and emphasized their toxicity. 142
Denials by leading African National Congress leaders such as Mbeki have ―undoubtedly
delayed and frustrated an effective response to the pandemic there.‖143
In the Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, colloquially known as
―TAC,‖ the Constitutional Court of South Africa reviewed a ruling by the High Court of
Pretoria finding that the government had acted unreasonably in (1) refusing to make
nevirapine (an antiretroviral drug used for HIV/AIDS treatment) accessible to the public
where medically indicated and (2) in not setting a national program timeframe to prevent
mother-to-child transmissions of HIV.144 The Constitutional Court confirmed that the
government had not fulfilled its constitutional mandate to "take reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation" of
the "right to access" to "health care services."145
Prior to the TAC litigation, the government had created a strategic five-year plan
to deal with mother-to-child transmission, using the drug nevirapine.146 Nevirapine had
been deemed safe and was recommended to mothers and newborn children to combat
HIV by several organizations, including the World Health Organization.147 The South
African government made nevirapine available at a limited number of pilot sites (two per
province); although the manufacturer had offered to make it available for free to the
South African government for five years to reduce mother-to-child transmission of
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HIV.148 Because it was not made available elsewhere, doctors in the public sector who
were not located at one of the pilot sites could not prescribe it for their patients.149
Treatment Action Campaign and others filed suit against the government,
claiming that the government had failed to fulfill its obligations under the Constitution in
relation to providing health care services for HIV-positive mothers and their newborn
babies.150 They argued that the government failed its constitutional mandate by
prohibiting the administration of nevirapine at public sites other than the pilot sites.151
Further, they argued, the government violated its constitutional duties by failing to
implement a comprehensive program for the prevention of mother-to-child HIV.152
The Court found that the policy confining the supply of nevirapine was not
reasonable under the circumstances, rejecting the government‘s arguments about safety,
efficacy, and resistance.153 Nevirapine was being provided to the government for free, so
cost was not a factor.154 The Court found that the South African government had already
determined the drug was safe.155 The government's policy being challenged even
prohibited facilities with the requisite testing and counseling capacities from
administering the drug.156 Administration of the drug was "simple," and its
administration was a potentially lifesaving intervention in the life of a young child.157
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Thus, the Court found the children's needs were "most urgent" and their rights were
"most in peril" as a result of the government's policy.158
The Court reasoned that after the decision not to make nevirapine available at
other hospitals and clinics was reversed, the government "will be able to devise and
implement a more comprehensive policy that will give access to health care services to
HIV-positive mothers and their newborn children, and will include the administration of
nevirapine where it is appropriate."159 However, the Court noted, "[t]hat does not mean
that everyone can immediately claim access to such treatment . . . . Every effort must,
however, be made to do so as soon as reasonably possible."160
The Court rejected the government's claim that adjudication of the issue would
violate the separation of powers.161 Notably, the government did not raise the issue of
justiciability, although it did cite potential balance of power violations if the court did not
show deference to the executive "concerning the formulation of its policies" or by issuing
an order which found that the executive failed to comply with its constitutional
obligations.162 The Court rejected a government argument that the separation of powers
precluded an order other than a declaration of rights because any other order would "have
the effect of requiring the executive to pursue a particular policy."163 The Court pointed
out that there are "certain matters that are pre-eminently within the domain of one or
other of the arms of government and not the others," and that "[a]ll arms of government
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should be sensitive to and respect this separation."164 However, it found that "[t]his does
not mean . . . that courts cannot or should not make orders that have an impact on
policy."165 Because the South African Constitution requires the government to "respect,
protect, promote, and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights," courts that find state policies
which are inconsistent with the Constitution must ensure "appropriate relief is afforded to
those who have suffered infringement of their constitutional rights."166 "In so far as that
constitutes an intrusion into the domain of the executive, that is an intrusion mandated by
the Constitution itself."167 The Court stated it would take into account the nature of the
right infringed and the nature of the infringement in crafting a judicial remedy, and
remedies could include supervisory jurisdiction.168 The Court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court had used a structural injunction to address educational equality issues in
the landmark decisions Brown v. Board of Education.169 Hence, the Court would apply
remedies that it deemed proper under the circumstances.
The Court, nevertheless, declined to create a justiciable private right for citizens
apart from the reasonableness limitation on the government.170 This differentiation
allowed the Court to remedy governmental action based on a reasonableness standard but
limited the Court‘s ability to remedy violations specific to particular individuals. In its
opinion, the Court noted that "courts are not institutionally equipped to make the wideranging factual and political enquiries necessary for determining what the minimum-core
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standards . . . should be, nor for deciding how public revenues should most effectively
spent."171 The Court further stated:
[c]ourts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have
multiple social and economic consequences for the community. The Constitution
contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the courts, namely to require
the state to take measures to meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the
reasonableness of these measures to evaluation. Such determinations of
reasonableness may in fact have budgetary implications, but are not in themselves
directed at rearranging budgets. In this way the judicial, legislative, and executive
functions achieve appropriate balance.172
It stressed that the Constitution did not "expect more of the State than is achievable
within its available resources."173 Hence, the "corresponding rights themselves are
limited by reason of the lack of resources."174
The Court found that the overarching policy of the government had failed; thus
because of the pressing need to ensure the prevention of the loss of life and because of
the circumstances surrounding the nevirapine disagreement, the Court ordered the
government to devise a "comprehensive and co-ordinated programme" to progressively
realize the rights of pregnant women and newborn children to have access to health
services.175 It ordered specific relief, requiring the government to remove restrictions that
prevented nevirapine from being made available at hospitals and clinics not included in
the pilot program, to permit and facilitate the use of nevirapine to reduce mother-to-child
transmissions of HIV where medically indicated, to make provision for nevirapine
counselors at other locations, and to take reasonable measures to extend the testing and
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counseling facilities at other sites.176 In doing so, it noted that its orders did "not preclude
[the] government from adapting its policy in a manner consistent with the
Constitution."177
In this decision, the Court used the Grootboom framework of reasonableness, but
developed its jurisprudence to encompass important national policy decisions, where
those policy decisions violated the South African Constitution‘s Bill of Rights. Even in
the midst of this revolutionary economic, social, and cultural human rights jurisprudence,
however, the Court crafted a narrow role for itself—to maintain the proper balance of
power among governmental spheres. Far from overstepping its judicial bounds, the
South African Constitutional Court has paved a new vision of the Court‘s role in
adjudicating economic, social, and cultural rights.
iii. The Effect of South African Jurisprudence in the Area of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
Both the Grootboom and the TAC decisions show that nations can develop new
modes of addressing economic, social, and cultural rights. Such modes recognize that
true protection requires enforcement and redressability, although the type of protection
may vary based on the nature of the right at issue.
Furthermore, South African jurisprudence has shown that its courts properly
respect the governmental balance of powers. While enabling enforcement of economic,
social, and cultural rights, the South African Constitutional Court maintained a
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conservative judicial role.178 Because of the balance of powers concern inherent in
adjudicating economic, social, and cultural rights, this approach has been entirely proper.
Indeed, Cass Sunstein described the South African Constitutional Court‘s decisions as
―restrained,‖ ―respectful,‖ and ―deferential‖ to the state and legislative branch.179 The
Court has not endorsed the view that the judicial branch can or will review budgeting
decisions regarding social, economic, and cultural rights; although some decisions may
have budgetary implications.180 It has restrained itself from infringing upon the proper
sphere of legislative and executive powers, yet it retains its proper role in reviewing
decisions for their constitutionality. As Mark Kende notes, ―[t]he striking feature in these
cases is the Court‘s pragmatic balancing of its transformative role and separation of
powers concerns.‖181 By using a reasonability standard, the Court shields itself from
political decisions, thereby preserving the balance of powers.
In effect, through the reasonableness requirement, the Court has given meaning to
economic, social, and cultural rights by providing citizens with positive albeit somewhat
weak claims against the government.182 These claims are weaker than some positive
rights because they require courts to review only the reasonableness of the government‘s
efforts to address such rights, much like an administrative decision, rather than providing
direct relief. Stronger positive rights are rights that demand specific state behaviors.
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Weaker positive rights ―do not support a right to [that thing] per se, but a right to
reasonable state measures that make [that thing] progressively available and accessible . .
. . The core value achieved through the formulation is a process one: government must be
deliberative and rational. It must formulate considered and appropriate response to the
social and welfare needs of its people.‖183
Using the reasonability approach, the South African Constitutional Court has
assumed review powers over government efforts to implement economic, social, and
cultural rights. This method allows political branches a large amount of autonomy to
craft particular solutions, as long as any particular solution is ―reasonable,‖ as determined
by the judicial branch. This approach effectively responds to concerns about the role of
the judiciary in adjudicating such rights; but it also provides a method of redressability
for economic, social, and cultural rights, properly safeguarding them as justiciable
constitutional rights for citizens.
iv. Understanding Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in
Context
In the South African context, the Constitutional Court determined that
government efforts to fulfill economic, social, and cultural rights must be ―reasonable.‖
If other countries adopt the South African approach, they might wonder how
―reasonable‖ should be interpreted by judicial officers, politicians, and others because
applying a reasonability standard only works if there is a general consensus about what it
means. How should its definition be interpreted in other socio-historical communities
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when the underlying moral justification for these rights is based on a pragmatic
agreement (the Universal Declaration) rather than substantive moral content? In
particular, how can political judgments be divorced from judicial determinations of
reasonability?
There are a number of ways ―reasonable‖ can be understood. Because the
underlying moral justification may vary from community to community, there may well
be different approaches to the determination of reasonability and, more generally, the role
of these rights in a particular society. The particular determination of the role of
economic, social, and cultural rights will rely, to a large extent, on particular sociohistorical conditions. In South Africa, for instance, many of the country‘s conditions are
a direct result of government and private abuses of power during apartheid. The
application of economic, social, and cultural rights in the South African context is an
attempt to correct those abuses and re-distribute power equally across South African
society. Other countries may be dealing with very different socio-historical
circumstances; therefore, their understanding of the role of economic, social, and cultural
rights may also be different. Certainly, the application of these rights across societies
should reflect their particular socio-historical circumstances, whether it is correcting
institutionalized power imbalances or latent social, cultural, and economic inequities.
Philosophers can and should help clarify the role of economic, social, and cultural
rights within communities, and some of this work has already begun. For instance,
Martha Nussbaum argues that individuals need a minimum threshold of human
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capabilities. 184 These capabilities provide an essential basis for realizing one‘s
humanness, including bodily health, bodily integrity, emotions, practical reason, and
social interaction, among others.185 Hence, it becomes incumbent upon the state to
ensure the fulfillment of these basic capabilities. Under this approach, economic, social,
and cultural rights are important because they help contributes to the protection and
development of Nussbaum‘s conception of human ―capabilities,‖ which leads to human
flourishing (ευδαιμονία). In this instance, then, such rights functionally ensure the
actualization of a minimum threshold for human capabilities across a society.
There are also other possible approaches to understanding the role of such rights,
and philosophers should continue to help address the role these rights play. Without a
basic understanding of how these rights function within a community, a judicial decision
could be reduced to a political decision. Fortunately, judges are themselves products of
their socio-historical circumstances; as such, they reflect their communities‘ ideals and
values. However, a deeper understanding of the role of these rights is crucial to their
equitable applicability across a nation, and thus, this area of philosophical understanding
is crucial for the long-term success of economic, social, and cultural rights. Such
understandings of rights can be pragmatically useful to courts as they interpret these
rights in their socio-historical contexts, and philosophers should continue to develop
understanding in this area.
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IV.

Conclusion

Economic, social, and cultural rights have suffered for decades as the ―poor
relations‖186 in the international human rights family. Although people, governments,
and entities generally recognize that economic, social, and cultural rights are important,
their potential as rights has not been actualized. In the modern age, governments have
looked to historical precedent when forming the boundaries of their constitutional social
compacts, and this has limited the content of constitutions to the protection of civil and
political rights. Constitutions generally have not recognized economic, social, and
cultural rights until now because of their unique nature as rights that often require
significant resource allocation and corresponding concerns about their role in liberal
political systems. The South African example has dramatically illustrated that such rights
can be constitutionalized without upsetting a government‘s balance of power, and it has
provided a preliminary roadmap for other countries to follow. Using a visionary
constitution, the South African example provides clear insights into how countries can
institute such rights as constitutionally protected principles, giving them real, cognizable
value for everyday citizens.
However, the South African experience is only one model for the practical
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights. It is based on the current
implementation structure of civil and political rights in many western constitutions.
Certainly, there are other possibilities for the implementation of economic, social, and
cultural rights that may better fit the unique nature of such rights or the particular ethno-

186

Deprose Muchena, “The Place of Economic and Social Rights in Human Rights and Development
Discourse,” Open Space 2.4 (2009): 10–17, 11.

51

historical context of a country while also preserving the redressability of such rights for
citizens. Under the South African model, for instance, a grievance generally must be
widespread before a court can act (otherwise, a plaintiff would be unable to prove that the
government‘s action were unreasonable). This approach to economic, social, and cultural
rights allows people a means of redressability, but it is a very limited redressability.
Thus, in the South African context, isolated economic, social, and cultural rights
violations may not have a remedy. Furthermore, under the South African model, there is
little redress if the political branch ignores the judicial branches‘ opinion in an economic,
social, and cultural rights case. Such an approach relies on each branch respecting its
sphere of power, but likewise, this approach breaks down if any government branch
disregards its proper boundaries of power or ignores its proper functional role. While the
South African model illustrates a possible treatment of economic, social, and cultural
rights, it is not the only approach. Philosophers, politicians, activists, concerned citizens,
constitution-writers, and others should not neglect other possibilities that will also help
realize economic, social, and cultural rights—possibly even more effectively than the
South African model. In the future, other models, both constitutional treatments of rights
and non-constitutional treatments, should be evaluated for their effectiveness, including
looking at the traditions of other nation-states and civil societies.
In addition, this thesis has not addressed an inherent tension between civil and
political rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. The separation of political and
civil rights from economic, social, and cultural rights is largely a historical construct:
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The right to work, for example, is a right to economic participation that is
instrumentally and intrinsically valuable in ways very much like the right to
political participation. Cultural rights are perhaps most closely related to
individual civil liberties, given the integral place of religion, public speech, and
mass media in the cultural life of most communities. The social or cultural right
to education is intimately connected with the civil or political right to freedom of
speech, belief, and opinion, and so forth.187
While there are many similarities between the two types of rights and while they are
often interrelated and interdependent, they may also conflict. For example, while most
cultural practices are healthy celebrations of culture, there are also troubling situations
concerning some cultural practices. Cultural practices are meant to bind a community
together, but in some situations, such as female genital mutilation, group identity is
constructed at the expense of a population‘s least politically, socially, or economically
powerful members. Those practicing female genital mutilation claim that it is an
expression of their cultural right, yet individual civil and political rights to bodily
integrity are in direct conflict with this cultural right.188 Philosophers and others should
continue to consider the unique challenges presented by all of these rights, including
when and how they should be properly protected.189
Although this thesis has shown that economic, social, and cultural rights can be
judicially cognizable as constitutional provisions, truly securing such rights in any society
requires a much broader approach. The law is only the ―tip of a social iceberg.‖190 Legal
effectiveness and redressability depend both upon the law‘s formal provisions and
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complex social relations.191 Certainly any right may be frustrated by cultural practices.192
However, justiciability should no longer be considered as a persuasive reason not to
include economic, social, and cultural rights in constitutions. Although the enforcement
mechanism for these rights may differ from that of civil and political rights, it is no less
valid; nor should these rights continue to be treated as second-class rights.
Memorializing rights in constitutions is one way to give economic, social, and
cultural rights practical meaning for citizens. A transformative constitution and visionary
justices in South Africa have taken a long leap forward toward realizing these important
rights, and now is the time for other liberal democracies to contemplate how they can
actualize these rights for their citizens in the twenty-first century.
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